The Risks of Optimism
This entry was posted on 6/16/2007 6:35 PM and is filed under Generally Speaking.
I am an optimist, most of
the time. But
recent research suggests that optimists are less good predictors of
future outcomes than their depressed bothers and sisters. So, what
meaning does this have for me, and my fellow enthusiasts?
Here is what Daniel Kahneman, an economics professor
at Princeton and a recent Nobel laureate said, commenting on mistakes
made by overly optimistic executives:
"People assign much higher
probability to the truth of their opinions than is warranted . . . a
natural inclination to exaggerate our talents is amplified by a
tendency to misperceive the causes of events. The typical pattern is
for people to take credit for positive outcomes and to attribute
negative outcomes to external factors, no matter what their true cause."
I thought this a valuable insight,
clipped it, and put it aside. Then the failure of a mediation I was
conducting brought it back to mind. The husband was a successful
business executive, whose actions and statements were seen and heard by
his wife as blaming and threatening. His
wife, a musician, perceived herself as the victim of his intimidating ways,
and in our sessions emotionally withdrew, unable or unwilling to assert
her own interests.
I described this dynamic to my professional
colleagues, by way of explaining the failed outcome, for I had
terminated mediation when it became clear that the husband's bullying
ways, and the wife's retreat to tears and silence, made their
negotiation problematic. Now I was asking myself whether my decision was wise.
Kahneman suggests that one way to improve on
decision making would be to systematically analyze mistakes, although
he thought this was unlikely to happen with business managers,
suggesting they would resist adopting procedures that would be
threatening to them.
My colleagues and I love to talk about our
successful outcomes, especially if a case presented unusual challenges.
And we frequently consult with one another when faced with a difficult
case and suggest alternative strategies, but seldom do we devote much
time to systematically analyzing our failures, except to note the
external causes.
I can often identify my mistakes.
I am comfortable apologizing for them.
But little time is spent seriously considering how I
might have handled situations differently. Too much discomfort in that?
Perhaps CEOs with an eye on the Dow Jones
believe they must avoid disclosure of mistakes, lest the value of their stock decline. But my
asking what did I do wrong and how might I have done
this differently, is an analysis my colleagues and I can keep quite
private.
So, I've even decided to step across the boundary from my
professional to my personal life and pose the same questions when my optimistic plans go awry.